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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 03/01/2008

Accident number: 455

Accident time: 10:30

Accident Date: 02/05/2006

Where it occurred: Khoshal Khan Hostel
Complex, Dasht-iPadola, Chehelstoon,
Kabul City

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Class: Mechanical excavation
ID original source: Ops-27/266/06

Date of main report: 29/05/2006
Name of source: UNMACA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: M-19 AT blast

Ground condition: dry/dusty

Date record created: 03/01/2008

Date last modified: 03/01/2008

No of victims: 0

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: WGS 84

Coordinates fixed by: GPS

Map east: 06915881 E

Map north: 3445088 N

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
dog missed mine (?)
mechanical detonation (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
non injurious accident (?)
inadequate survey
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Accident report
The report of this accident was made available in August 2007 as a PDF file. Its conversion to
a text file for editing means that some of the formatting has been lost. The substance of the
BoI report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is held on record.
A single report covered two accidents (one on 2nd and one on 4th) that occurred at the same
site. Where appropriate, the detail of the accident is repeated in the two records held in this
database.
Text in [ ] is editorial comment.

Internal report
Mechanical Demining Accident at Chilstoon - 2 May 2006
1. Summary
1.1. At approx 1030 on 2 May 2006 an anti-tank mine detonated under the Gill bucket of a
[Demining group] Case 721 wheeled loader. The loader was engaged in clearing an anti-tank
minefield at Chilstoon (7km south of Kabul). There were no injuries and damage was minimal.
1.2. The [Demining group] has now carried out its internal investigation. The evidence
suggests that the operator had failed to maintain the correct depth (30cm) with his bucket.
2. Background.
2.1. The minefield at Chilstoon dates from fighting between Jamiat and Hizb-i-Islami in the
early 1990s. Some time after the fighting a rectangular wall was built, enclosing 181,000m2 of
gently sloping ground; however it is likely that the mineline extends beyond these walls. The
current task, which is high impact/[Demining group] priority 1A, is restricted to the area inside
the walls where a large secondary school is under construction.
2.2. Local builders are still working on the school, between 08:00 and 16:00 each day. The
area immediately around the school buildings is covered in building materials, so cannot be
cleared at present; the area under the buildings/foundations cannot be cleared at all.
2.3. Before construction of the school began, the area was cleared by [Demining dogs]. Since
then there have been a number of AT mine accidents. In December 2005 UNMACA tasked
[Survey group] to resurvey the task; and, having determined that mechanical clearance was
most appropriate, asked [Demining group] to re-clear the site. [Demining group] is awaiting
further details of the [dog] clearance (number, type and depth of mines) from UNMACA.
2.4. Clearance began on 17 April 2006, with two loaders (one Volvo, one Case 721) working
double shifts (06:00-18:00). To date clearance has been by Gill bucket to clear cross-lanes,
prior to the deployment of rippers and manual teams.
2.5. There being no indication of deep-buried mines, the Gill operators were instructed to cut
at 30cm depth. This is the standard depth for Gill buckets, based on over ten years
experience of mechanical mine clearance in Afghanistan, and conforms to [Demining group]
Mechanical SOP C.5.2: "Depth of Cut: The operator shall excavate to a minimum depth of 20
cm and should attempt to keep the cut to a maximum of 70 cm (unless advice says otherwise
from the survey) to prevent excess soil removal".
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2.6. Two Iranian M19s were found on 18 April — both of which were visible just below the
surface.
3. Description of accident
3.1. At approx 10:30, [Name removed], an operator with five years experience on the Case
721, was taking a cut when an AT mine exploded at the left front edge of his Gill bucket (see
below).

3.2. The precise location was 34'26'48.6" N, 069°09'29.7"E.
3.3. There were no casualties. The damage to the bucket was minimal — specifically the lefthand tooth was snapped off, and landed 180 metres away;
3.3.2.

The mole board was bent back about 5 cm out of true:

3.3.3. Two small welds were broken: one attaching the Gill system to the inside of the
bucket (top left), and one attaching a lifting eye on the left side of the bucket.
3.4. Immediately after the accident the operator reversed the loader about 5 metres, where it
remained parked pending the arrival of the [Demining group] investigation team. (This should
not have happened.)
4. Accident Investigation
4.1. The [Demining group] internal investigation was carried out on 2-3 May 2006 by [Name
removed] (Expat Officer (Central)) and [Name removed] (Regional Operations Officer
(Central), in consultation with [Name removed] (Programme Mechanical Officer), who was at
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Chilstoon when the accident happened, and [Name removed] (Mechanical Manager
(Central)).
4.2. An UNMACA accident investigation will follow.
5. Observations
5.1. From the limited damage to the bucket and from the position of the crater relative to the
lane, it seems likely that the mine detonated in front of the bucket rather than below it —
possibly as a result of indirect pressure.
5.2. It appears that the depth of the cut was less than the 30cm minimum that had been
ordered: a measurement taken 1.5 metres back from the seat of the explosion suggested that
the actual depth of the cut was around 2I cm. The ground on the site, whilst soft, is slightly
undulating, which makes it more difficult for operators to maintain the correct depth. In this
case, the loader had just crossed a road of hard-packed earth, and it is possible that the
operator had failed to regain the correct depth before he encountered the mine.
5.3. There is no evidence to suggest that this mine was buried below 30cm. A local policeman
who witnessed the accident offered the information that three or four AT mines had been
found during the excavation of foundations for the school, and suggested that at least one of
these may have been at 40cm depth. However there is no other evidence to corroborate this
view.
5.4. The loaders are operating close to the building site, and Kuchis [nomads] frequently pass
through the area. Moreover, when mechanical ripping commences, manual deminers will be
working on the same site. [Demining group] Mechanical SOP G.1.3 states that "minimum
mechanical safety distance is 100 metres, unless adequate cover is provided by man-made
shelter or natural features". The fact that the tooth flew 180 metres from the blast suggests
that this safety distance should be increased.
6. Recommendations
6.1. The operator has been interviewed and warned that any repetition will result in
disciplinary action.
6.2. Loader operators and team leaders must ensure that the minimum depth of cut is 30cm
below the original ground level. Where the ground is sloping or uneven the depth of cut
should be greater than 30cm to allow sufficient margin for error. The Chilstoon site includes a
number of trenches and ditches which may have been partly filled in since the mines were
laid; team leaders are to take particular care when excavating these.
6.3. A manual supervisor will be appointed to take overall charge of the task. His main role
will be ensure that mechanical teams do not operate with 200 metres of unprotected
personnel. With careful planning and control this should be possible. A Technical Survey
team has been tasked to produce an accurate scale map to assist in this process.
6.4. Mechanical team leaders are to be reminded that in the event of an accident the machine
must NOT be moved until the investigation is complete.

Independent investigation report
M19 AT mine detonated under Gill bucket of a [Demining group]-99 wheeled loader, the
loader was engaged in clearing anti-tank minefield.
History of the Minefield
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This MF locates at Dashti Padula of Chelstone, Ward -7, Kabul city and have been enclosed
by the walls of under construction Khoshal Khan Khatak Secondary School Hostel as it
covers 181,000 sqm area. It has been appraised as a high impact area. It was fighting front
line between Jamiat and Hezb Islami fighters in the years 1992 to 1996.
At first time this area had been surveyed by [Survey group] Sur-09 on 06 April 1997. The
survey team had divided this area to four minefields (MF# 353, 387, 392, and 395). The
minefields of this area were cleared by [Mine Dog group] at the same year. After clearance of
these tasks by [Mine Dog group], in this area about 9 accidents on local people have been
occurred of which two accidents has been recorded, investigated by AMAC, Kabul
investigation team and reported to UNMACA of 05 April 2006. One accident occurred on 1212-2005 at 11:00 am, as a result an Eight Cylinder truck was blown up. The second accident
erupted on 12 Feb. 2006 at 15:30 hrs, as a result a Hino truck was blown up. Due to
occurrence too many accidents and possibility of more mines with uncertified depth in this
area, Area Manager of AMAC, Kabul decided for re-clearance of this area by mechanical
teams. Therefore the AMAC area Manager contacted [Demining group] as the [Demining
group] agreed. As it has been reported to UNMACA in the mentioned investigation report.
As construction of hostel has already been started in this area some more activities will also
be conducted in the remaining area of the SHA, in order to clear the SHA at the soonest
convenient time, it requires using machinery system. The issue has been verbally discussed
and coordinated with [Demining group] and they are willing to use their VTF funded
machinery system for the clearance of this SHA.
Since clearance of this task has been started by [Demining group], two anti tank Iranian M-19
mines were also discovered by [Demining group] in this task. The depth of the two mines was
less then 30 cm.
LIAT has been tasked to cover this area as new SHA for the community

Description of the incident/accident
The type of the mine was M-19. Details of the incident are explained as bellow:
1. One anti tank mine blasted on 02 May 2006 at approximately 10:45 hrs. This incident
caused no casualities and the damage to the bucket was minimal (just one left side tooth of
the loader bucket was snapped off). The broken tooth of the bucket immediately was changed
with new one and next day the loader started to work normally. The type of the mine was M19 and depth of this mine was less then the assigned 30 cm clearance depth (21 cm).
Site conditions (at the time of the incident/accident). The terrain was described as uneven,
confined hillside. The soil was medium, dry. The weather was clear, warm and calm. There
was no vegetation.
Team and task details: QA check has not been conducted, since the team has come to this
task on 13th April 2006. The team works in two shifts: shift one from 6:00 am to 12:00 noon.
Shift two from 01:00 pm to 5:00 pm. There is a break from 09:30 to 09:45. The hand-tool used
was a “trowel”.

Conclusions
1. The operator worked alone in two shifts from 06:00 am to 17:00 pm. based on verbal
information we got from team leader of MC-05.
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2. The mine exploded under a tooth of the bucket as the top of the mine was open so the
mine pressure spread out in the open area so it caused minimum damage.
3. The depth of the cut was less then the minimum assigned 30 Cm excavation depth. The
maximum assigned depth which is 70 Cm, but as we saw the site it has not been
considered during excavation.
4. Technical survey has not been carried out and accurate scaled map was available in the
site with the team.

Recommendations
1. Technical survey should be conducted at first in order to collect more and precise
information about the site situation, depth of mine; mine type etc prior to starting
clearance operation.
2. Since the area is uneven, the team leader should prepare a free hand map with
highlighted critical points and show in it the clearance depth of the site different parts
3. The team leader based on his experience is to consider and examine each part of the
ground and ensure that the required depth during excavation is considered.
4. For each loader working in the MF is to be appointed two operators, especially for those
working in two shifts.
5. The team should meet clearance depth from original ground surface.

STATEMENTS
Statement and Witness Report
[Mechanical Officer (controlling the team), working in demining since 1998.]
Data of the person making the statement / witness report

Questions:
1. Please explain how the incident occurred?
2. How many mines have been detected by your team in this task so far and what is the type
of the detected mines?
3. Please say about the depth of the mine caused the incident and also say how much
excavation depth has been assigned for this task?
4. Daily, how many hours the team works in the site and whether the team members have
opportunity for rest during work or not?
5. Please say the date and time of the incident?
6. Please explain the work procedure of [Demining group] mechanical teams.
7. In your opinion, what mistakes have caused the incident?
Answers:
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1. It is routine that the mechanical teams works are checked by [Demining group] responsible
personalities. One day ago, mechanical manager had come and in the incident day I came to
check and control the work process. At first I controlled work of MC-11 working adjacent to
MC-5, then I moved toward MC-05, along the way I heard the voice of explosion. Being the
first person reached to the incident point, assured the team member by VHF of the health of
operator and intactness of the machine. Then the team nurse with ambulance reached to the
incident point. The operator was completely normal, one rear indicator and one teeth of the
machine bucket was broken. When we checked the mine I saw that the depth of digging was
less then as compared with the required depth. After that I informed all the [Demining group]
authorities about the incident, as operations officer and other authorities of [Demining group]
also came and observed the site, took necessary photos then the machine was shifted to a
proper place for repair. One day after, the machine bucket was changed and the backhoe
started to work.
2. Till now we have found two Iranian M-19 Anti Tank mines, the mine caused the accident
was the third mine.
3. The excavation depth for the [Demining group] mechanical teams is from 20 cm to 70 cm,
but in this task the excavation depth has been assigned 30 cm, but to say anything about the
exact depth of the exploded mine is difficult.
4. The team works in two shifts, in shift one operation commences at 6:00 am and ends at
12:00 noon; the second shift commences at 1300 hrs and ends at 1700 hrs. The team has
two loader operators as they are working periodically.
5. The incident erupted on 02 may 2006 at 10:30 am.
6. The [Demining group] mechanical teams have two kinds work procedures. As you better
know, the mechanical machines almost gets out of order during the work as sometimes its
repair due to shortage of expert mechanics and spare parts takes long time. In order to avoid
the mechanical teams' idleness, the mechanical teams always work daily in two shifts. If the
mechanical equipments are fully available in the team, the teams work daily one shift. The
teams working in shifts have two breaks, one break takes half an hour and the other takes 15
minutes.
7. If due to shortage of mechanical machines the work is carried out in two shifts the team has
just one 15 minutes break. As one team work from 6 to 12 and then the second team comes
and works with the same machine of the first team in the second shift from 1 to 5 pm.

Statement and Witness Report 2
Data of the person making the statement / witness report
[Team Leader – on leave at time of accident. Experienced since 1997.]
Question:
1. Dear Commander although you were not present in the field while the accident occurred
after you returned to duty in your opinion what will he the cause of the accident?
2. From the technical point of view we know that during the excavation first the bucket teeth
must touch the ground therefore due to this reason first the bucket teeth must be destroyed
and then the body of the bucket but in this case the bucket teeth is completely save and the
center of the bucket frame got damaged would you like to say what will be the cause of the
accident?
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3. Dear commander to avoid from such accidents in the future and solve the same problem
what is your idea and recommendations?
Answer:
Dear sir I would like to state in my opinion as the excavation is done as per norm of SOP (30
cm) and the depth of mine was more than 30 Cm so, the accident has happened due direct
pressure on the mine.
2. Since the excavation is done as per the norm of SOP and the mine was deep therefore it
seems that during the excavation pressure has been brought on the mine and the pressure
on the mine has caused the explosion it is worth mentioning to state during the excavation the
bucket teeth is move a little bit to the back and the weight of the bucket it self plus the
excavated soil is caused the explosion.
3. As per my observation long period has passed from the time of plantation of these mines
and they have plant these mines very deep and unprofessional. The two previous accidents
which have occurred in the area seem the depth of the mine was deeper from the SOP norm
so my recommendation is to increase the depth of the excavation from the current depth
which is 30 Cm.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the
investigators determined that the operator was not processing the ground to the required
depth. If the mine had not detonated it would have been left behind. The secondary cause is
listed as “Unavoidable” because the uneven ground and the improvised machine may have
combined to make it unrealistic to expect the operator to be able to maintain an even depth. If
this is the case, those responsible for giving the task to a machine that was unable to conduct
would be demonstrating a “Management control inadequacy”.
The fact that the area had already been “cleared” using dogs and was being subjected to a
second inefficient “clearance” method raises some questions about whether quality is being
sacrificed for speed, and whether mines are still being left behind.
The “Inadequate survey” referenced under Notes is mentioned because the investigators
recommended that a Technical Survey to determine the depth of the mines be conducted.
The quality of the demining group’s internal investigation report was unusually high.
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